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The American Merchant Marine is of great Significance to the United
States Navy in time of war. Without a sufficient number of merchant vessels
of the proper types and characteristics, any plan for the logistic support of
overseas forces would be doomed to failure. It is the Navy's job to shepherd
cargo vessels to their destinations, but it is the job of the Merchant Marine
to load, transport, and finally off-load the cargoes.
Too few naval officers are well informed of the operations of our
Merchant Marine. There is some misunderstanding among officers, and civilians
alike, as to what the merchant fleet, and the maritime industries consist of;
why they are important to the national economy as well as to the national de-
fense; and what problems the Merchant Marine faces today. This paper is an
attempt to explain the function of the United States-flag commercial fleet and
to explain some important segments of our national maritime policy.
Sooner or later, every successful naval officer will be confronted with
the matter of dealing with the Merchant Marine, or some element of the maritime
industry. It is important that officers have at least a general knowledge of
this very broad subject.
The narrative is brief and a minimum of detail has been included to des-
cribe the most important elements of United States maritime policy. To cover
the field extensively would be impossible in a paper of this length, for the
marine-shipping industry is complicated and enshrouded by many layers of laws
and regulations, and laws-within-laws, and regulations-within-regulations. An
iv

industry with a history as long and as colorful as the Merchant Marine's is
bound to be complicated and deeply involved with laws, customs, and traditions.
I am deeply grateful to Mr. ". E. Bull, Civilian Shipping Advisor to the
Commander of the Military Sea Transportation Service and Professor of Transpor-
tation at Georgetown University, for originally directing me toward this sub-
ject. I am also grateful to Captain D. R. McMullen, USN, also of BUSTS, for his
wise counsel and sound advice; and to the members of the Washington staff of
the American Merchant Marine Institute who provided me with much current data
concerning the ocean shipping business; to Mr. E. C. Pollack, legal advisor to
the Armed Service Petroleum Purchasing Agency; to Mr. John J. McMullen, Chief
of the Construction and Repair Division, Maritime Administration; and Mr. Heine
of the Office of Ship Statistics.
I am particularly grateful to Congressman William Maillard of California,
and his staff, whose introduction to the permanent staff of the House Committee
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America Needs a Prosperous Merchant Marine
There are more merchant vessels under the United States flag than any
other. United States seaports handle more foreign trade than do those of any
other country. Yet the United States is not a "maritime nation" in the strict
interpretation of the phrase. The shipbuilding and marine shipping industries
of this country are but a small segment of our economy. "The active merchant
fleet, presently consisting of less than one-third of the total U. S. merchant
marine, lifts less than one-quarter of the cargo tonnage transported in the
waterborne foreign trade of the United States." 1
Despite its dwarfish size in comparison with the giant manufacturing and
agricultural industries, this small industry draws much attention both at home
and abroad. It has a clamorous lobby in Washington which demands much atten-
tion from the legislative and executive branches of the government. But it is
not entirely unfitting that this minority industry demand attention because
America needs a robust and vigorous merchant marine. "A necessity in war, and
a source of independence and strength in peace, " the merchant fleet has been
termed by no less an authority than President Eisenhower himself as "the fourth
Wytze Gorter, United States Merchant Marine Policies; Some International
Economic Implications
.
(Princeton, N. J.: (Princeton University Press, 1053),
p. 1; also, "Essays in International Finance," pamphlet, No. 23, June, 1955,
published by Princeton Gr:j. chool of Economics.
2RADM Wra. S. Benson, The Merchant Marine
.




2arm of our national defense."3
With the recognition that we need a merchant marine, we are faced with
the questions: (1) how much is enough? and, (2) how much can we afford? These
questions have plagued American policy-makers since the early days of the
republic.
Why Have a Merchant Marine?
The inescapable fact is that the United States-flag merchant marine can-
not compete on an equal basis with cheap foreign shipping. Without government
subvention the United States-flag fleet would gradually disappear from the
seven seas.
The question might well be asked: If foreign ships can provide the
service cheaper, then why not let them? Such a question at least has the
virtue of facing the issue squarely. This very question has been asked a good
many times in the past. The answer is, likewise, to be found in the past.
Brushing aside for a moment the grave need for a merchant fleet in time
of war, it is an economic reality that the United States merchant marine exerts
a stabilizing effect upon the world shipping market. A foreign monopoly of
ocean shipping has worked to the detriment of American trade and commerce twice
in recent history: once during the early months of the First World War, and
again during the mid-thirties, during the great British shipping strike of
1933. By 1914, the American merchant fleet had deteriorated to the point
where it could carry only about 9% of the country's foreign export, and exporters
3
President of the United States, Budget Message to the United States
Congress . January, 1954.
4
During the first few weeks of World War I, dry-cargo rates increased
from $1.00 per ton-mile to $20.00 per ton mile.
'I'. «-,'
3relied heavily on foreign shipping. Within a few weeks after hostilities
opened in Europe* shipping rates rose as much as 2,000 percent. American
cargoes rotted on the wharves in want of cargo space. The sane thing happened
in 1933, but to a lesser extent—freight rates rose only about 1,400 percent.
The most compelling reason for a strong United States merchant fleet is
the need for national defense. During the last year of World War II, the
United States-flag merchant marine delivered an average of more than 6,500
long tons of cargo and military supplies to U. S. combat forces overseas every
hour of every day and night—and at times it wasn't enough. 5 As President
(then General) Eisenhower said in 1944, ''World War II was won the day we, in
the United States, reached the point where we were building merchant ships
faster than the Nazis could sink them. "° Not only are ships needed in war, but
a capable shipbuilding industry as well, and a nucleus of trained and exper-
ienced merchant marine officers and crewmen. The logistic requirements for
the successful prosecution of a future war may be far greater than were those
of World War II. 7
United States Maritime Policy
Present United States maritime policy is dedicated to the purposes of
maintaining a merchant marine capable of carrying a substantial portion of the
foreign commerce, and acting as an effective naval and military auxiliary in
time of war. The present policy was first expressed by Congress in 1920, and
confirmed in later laws. The most recent policy statement is to be found in
John J. Collins, "The American Merchant Marine in World War III,"
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings . April, 1956, pp. 406-15.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe
.
(New York: Doubleday
Book Co., 1946), p. 219.
Collins, op. cit., p. 407.

4the second paragraph of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946:
Section 2 (a):
It is necessary for the national security and the development and
maintenance of the domestic and the export and import foreign com-
merce of the United States that the United States have an efficient
and adequate American-owned merchant marine (1) sufficient to carry
its domestic water-borne export and import foreign commerce and to
provide shipping service on all routes essential for maintaining
the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all
times; (2) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary
in time of war or national emergency; (3) owned and operated under
the United States flag by citizens of the United States; (4) com-
posed of the best -equipped, safest, and most suitable types of ves-
sels, constructed in the United States and manned by trained and
efficient citizen personnel; and (5) supplemented by efficient
American-owned facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair, marine
insurance, and other auxiliary services.
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such a mer-
chant marine.**
For the purposes of this study, the execution of United States maritime
policy can be divided into five basic segments: (1) Construction-Differential
Subsidies; (2) Operating-Differential Subsidies; (3) control of competition;
(4) cabotage regulations; and, (5) cargo preference.
The subsidies, control of competition, and cabotage regulations have
been generally accepted at home and abroad, but the cargo preference principle
which has reopened an old argument, is the subject of great controversy in the
shipping world here and abroad.
In the following chapters the background of United States maritime
policy will be sketched out, and with that background in view, each segment of
our present policy will be discussed. Considerable attention will be given to
that lively current issue—the Cargo Preference Act of 1954.
3
tterchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, P. L. 321, 60 Stat 41, 79th Congress,




The expression "merchant marine" represents much more than just sea-
going vessels. It includes the shipbuilders and the whole industrial army
which maintains, repairs, and services the commercial vessels of the United
States-flag merchant fleet; it includes the many different processes involved
in building, maintaining, and operating the ports and harbors; labor—the sea-
men and the longshoremen; the merchant marine means a sprawling, complex, but
vital industrial mechanism in land-locked places as well as on the sea coasts,
and directly or indirectly, providing work for thousands of Americans. It in-
cludes, too, the warehousemen, ship chandlers, brokers, and freight forwarders,
just to name a few of the myriad of enterprises which depend on ocean transport
It has been estimated that some three million people earn their livings
through the operation or servicing of the United States merchant fleet. Twenty-
two of the forty-eight states have major seaports. Two hundred and fifty-four
Representatives and forty-four Senators in the United States Congress have
constituents directly or indirectly interested in the maritime industries.
About ten percent of all movable American production goes to overseas markets.
In September, 1952, the Maritime Administration estimated the replacement value
of United States-flag privately owned merchant ships at something more than
$7.3 billions; and this figure does not include the several billions invested
by shipbuilding and service industries.
Though America's maritime industry may be small with respect to other
5
Ul HI
6segments of industry, it is still, politically and financially, big business.
The American Merchant Fleet
At the end of World War II, there were 4,861 sea-going vessels of all
types in the U. S. flag merchant fleet. 9 At the end of 1952, there were a
total of 3,462 vessels, both active and inactive, in the fleet of which 1,574
were active in either foreign or domestic commerce. As of the beginning of
1953, only 1297 privately-owned vessels were engaged in ocean shipping, of
which 642 were in the foreign trade and 470 in the domestic and non-contiguous
trades. 10
The analysis, by ship types, of the privately-owned merchant fleet as of
the end of 1952 was:








The composition of the merchant fleet has not changed significantly
since January, 1953. The actual number of vessels is somewhat fluid because
vessels are removed from, or returned to, service as the demand for ocean-
shipping changes.
q
These figures do not include vessels on the Great Lakes and Inland
waterways, special types, or merchant -types owned by the armed forces. Nor are
the 546 vessels on lend-lease to foreign allies included. Source: U. S. De-
partment of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Division of Ship Statistics.
Non-contiguous trade is carried on between the U. S. mainland and (J. S.
territories or possessions such as Puerto Rico, Panama Canal, Hawaii, a nd
Alaska.

7The Reserve Fleet provides a cushion to meet changing demands in the
shipping market. In times of shipping stringency, the Maritime Administration
may activate vessels for lease or charter to private operators. When demand
drops off, vessels are returned to a reserve status. As a result of this
cushion, dry and bulk cargo rates have remained fairly stable for the past few
years; but in the bulk-liquid trade the story has been different. With a
steady upward trend in the demand for tankers, rates have consistently moved
upward. Reason? There were only twelve tankers in the inactive fleet as of
December 31, 1952.
Figures 1 and 2, pages 8 and 9, show the composition of the United States
government -owned merchant fleet as of December 31, 1952.
The Merchant Fleet Operators
Shipowners and ship operators fall into two general classes—berth line
operators and tramp operators. The two classes are distinguished by the nature
of their operations.
Berth Liners conduct scheduled sailing over regularly established trade
routes between the major seaports of the world. Individual lines are often
confined to certain routes and geographic areas by mutual agreement with other
shipping lines. Ordinarily, liners cannot deviate from their regular paths
without prior approval of their conference members, except, of course, in
emergencies. Liner operatioas ere roughly comparable to sea-going railroads
operating over regular routes on regular schedules. Off- route shipping must
be carried in Tramp vessels.
Tramp vessels of many types range over all the seven seas seeking profit-
able cargoes wherever they can be found. Tramps do not operate on schedule or
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motor-trucks ashore who haul any load their trucks can profitably handle.
The berth liners of which the United States Lines, Grace, or Lyke
Brothers are typical examples, move a large percentage of the world's packaged
or crated goods in the international trade. They also carry most of the sur-
face-transported passengers and most of the mail. Like railroads, they accept
cargo in either small or large amounts and the majority of their cargoes are
less-shipload lots.
Tramp ships on the other hand, move most of the world's bulk cargo
such as grain, coal, or minerals, and most important, most of the petroleum.
About ninety percent of the world's crude oil and petroleum products move in
tramp tankers. As a rule, tramps accept cargo only on a full-cargo basis
because they can seldom operate profitably on mixed cargoes. There is another
important difference between the operations of the liners and the tramps, and
that is the matter of shipping rates.
Almost without exception, berth line operators are members of inter-
national shipping conferences, or shipping rings. By mutual agreement among
the members, liner freight rates are set within close limits. Thus, competi-
tion is limited in the liner trade. (The subject of Shipping Conferences is
covered in more detail in Chapter V).
In the tramp trade, the situation is quite the reverse. Tramp rates are
strictly market prices and vary from day to day according to routes, types of
cargo, and seasonal patterns. For the most part, the tramp rate is what the
trade will bear, and they respond very quickly to changes in the demand for
cargo space. Rates are usually quoted on the basis of ton-miles, or on a
per-diea,or voyage, basis. The Military Sea Transportation Service makes ex-
tensive use of tramp shipping in the movement of Department of Defense cargoes.

11
MSTS may charter vessels at a certain rate per day or for a given period of
time or for a particular voyage. But tramp charter rates are highly sensitive
to market conditions—-when shipping is tight the rates rise, and when demand
slackens the rates drop,
American tramps must consider operating costs more carefully than do
foreign-flag vessels. The daily cost of operating a 0. S.-flag vessel is near-
ly twice that of a foreign-flag vessel of similar type. In a slack market,
American vessels tend to be the "price leaders** in the tramp trade. Foreign
vessels will customarily set their rates just below the U. S.-flag tramp rate.
When American tramps are just breaking even, the foreigners are "making a kill-
ing.** The tramp trade is strictly a "dog-eat -dog** business.
Tramps procure cargo through shipping agents who work on a commission
basis or through shipping exchanges. In contrast to the berth lines, among
whom competition is limited, the tramp lines operate in open competition.
U. S.-flag tramps usually come out second best.
The Importance of the Tramps
During 1955, 63.3% of all United States ocean-borne dry cargo exports
were carried by tramp vessels of either 0. S. or foreign registry. The remain-
ing 36.7% moved in liners. In gross tonnage (carrying capacity), the size of
the world's tramp fleet is nearly double the size of the liner fleet. In
actual number of vessels, the tramp fleet is more than twice the size of the
liner fleet, since the carrying capacity per ship is usually somewhat less. Of
the total 44.5 million long-tons of dry cargo exported from the 0. S. in 1955,
U. S. flag liners carried 14.4% and U. S. tramps only 5.8% By contrast,




Id Figure 3 the importance of the tramp trade in the ocean shipping can
be seen. It is evident that (J. S. flag tramps are not carrying tonnage in pro-
portion to the size of the fleet.
The merchant fleets of the world consist of about one-third liners and
two-thirds tramps. At the present time, the tramp vessels in the U. S. flag
fleet number less than one-half the number of liners and the tramps are
steadily diminishing in number. Based on the liner-tramp ratio in other mer-
chant fleets, the U. S. flag fleet has about one-sixth the number required to
maintain a balanced fleet.
Cross Trade
An important segment of the ocean-shipping business, particularly to
the tramps, is cross trade. As distinguished from direct trade which is carriei
on directly between two nations in a vessel registered in one country or the
other, cross trade consists of cargo carried between two nations by a vessel
flying the flag of a third nation. It is the ability of foreign-flag tramp
ships, vis-a-vis American-flag tramps, to carry on a favorable cross trade
which makes the foreign tramp operations profitable. To illustrate the inter-
national significance of cross trade, the following figures are appropriate:
During the years 1953 and 1954, Norwegian-flag vessels carried over
thirteen times as much cargo between the United States and other countries as
they carried between the United States and their homeland. In fact, the major
participation of Norwegian vessels in United States commerce occurred between
U. S. House of Representatives, Operation and Administration of the
Cargo Preference Act, Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries. January 31 - February 16. 1956
.
(Washington, D. C. : Government
Printing Office, 1956), p. 514.
.
13
the United States and other foreign countries, not in trade with Norway herself.
In 1954, British tramps obtained six times as much cargo between the U. S. and
other countries as between the U. S. and the United Kingdom. Danish vessels
obtained 94. 3$ of their cargoes in cross trade. A study of the merchant fleet
operations of nine maritime nations 12 reveals that nearly four times as much
cargo was carried in the cross trades as was moved in direct trades with their
homelands. Most of this cross trade was carried in tramps.
Due to their high operating costs, U. S. flag tramps cannot compete
favorably in the cross trade. The inability to participate in cross trade to
a profitable degree is one of the most serious weaknesses of the U.S. flag
tramp fleet. There is no government subsidy to assist them and preference
cargoes are usually one-way hauls. Since there is no profit in hauling salt
water, any successful tramp operation must be assured of a full hold in both
directions. A tramp cannot afford to travel in ballast.
Ship Types
There are many different types of vessels in the marine shipping indus-
try. Generally speaking, they fall into three broad classes—freighters,
tankers, and combination vessels.
Freighters can be subdivided into dry-cargo and bulk-dry cargo carriers.
Tankers are classed according to the type of liquid cargo they are fitted to
carry; some carry crude oil, others ere rigged to carry molasses or highly-
volatile fluids. Combination vessels may be primarily passenger ships equipped
to carry dry or bulk cargo.
12
U. S. Department of Commerce, A Review of Direct and Indirect Types of
Maritime Subsidies With Special Reference to Cargo Preference
.
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Ships vary greatly in their carrying-capacity (gross tonnage), speed,
and cargo-handling capabilities. Often the type cargo they carry is limited by
their loading and unloading rigs. The faster ships are employed in the liner
trade where speed is at a premium; the slower vessels are in the tramp trade
where speed is of secondary consideration.
The freighters are the most numerous seen in the commercial fleets, with
tankers second. Combination vessels are a small minority.
Block Obsolescence
"Eighty-one percent of the 1,297 ships comprising the commercially oper-
ated United States domestic and foreign fleet will be twenty years old during
the period 1961-1965. 3 By 1960, a large percentage of these vessels will no
longer be competitive in world trade.
Figure 4 shows the age groupings of vessels in the privately-owned active
fleet. Note the predominance of war-built ships.
It is clear that if replacements are not built until the ships become
obsolete, then the work-load in the shipyards will be beyond their capacity.
What is needed is a progressive plan of ship replacement which will provide
a number of new vessels each year over a number of years.
American ship operators are relying on war-built ships. Most of these
were acquired from the government under the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 at
prices ranging from $50 to $120 per deadweight ton. The cost of new construc-
tion would run from $150 per dwt ton for a new tanker, to $300 per dwt ton for
a new freighter. The war-built vessels were cheap investments; the depreci-
ation expenses are low, and they were purchased under low-interest, long-term
13


















mortgages. With these vessels many of the operators are showing profits they
could not show on larger investments. However, most of the war-built fleet is
capable of no more than ten knots average speed at sea. Already, ten knots is
too slow for a competitive ship.
During the last thirty years, the average speed of tramp ships has in-
creased from ten to fourteen knots. In addition, more efficient power plants
and lower fuel consumption have decreased steaming costs. It is evident that
U. S. operators will need better, faster vessels in the world trade before much
longer.
The Maritime Administration has developed the 60-ships-a-year program
to promote the gradual replacement of obsolescent merchant vessels. The aims
of this program are shown on Figure 5.
The replacement of aging ships is also important from the standpoint of
national defense requirements. The speed factor is of great importance in
naval operations. On June 19, 1953, Hear Admiral R. E. Wilson, USN, Deputy
Commander of the Military Sea Transportation Service, stated before a Congres-
14
sional Committee that the minimum speeds desired for military service should
be 18 knots for dry-cargo ships, 20 knots for tankers, and 22 knots for troop
ships. Admiral Wilson further stated that fuel consumption economies and
modern cargo handling facilities are of primary importance.
A long-range program of fifty ships per year for ten years was under-
taken in 1936 which permitted the development of shipbuilding facilities and
the employment of shipyard labor to the point where tbey could be expanded
quickly to meet World War II requirements. The country is faced with practi-
14
U. S. Senate, Merchant Marine Studies . Hearings before the subcommittee
on Maritime Subsidies, Committee on Interstate and Domestic Commerce, 83d Cony.,
1st Session, Part I, May-July, 1953, p. 68.

17
cally the sane problem of block obsolescence today as existed in 1938. A ship-
building program of sixty ships a year is of sufficient magnitude to solve
these problems and also meet our shipyard nucleus requirements. It has been
estimated that the cost of such a program would approach $400 million a year;
if the government paid half the cost, or $200 million, it would amount to less
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CHAPTER III
THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
MARITIME POLICY, 1783 TO 1916
In the beginning, America was a maritime nation. The early American
economy was built on a foundation of international trade. In the "golden age"
of American shipping (1789-1830), 0. S. flag vessels moved nearly ninety per-
cent of the foreign commerce of the country. After the Civil War, Americans
turned their attention away from the sea and looked toward the settling of the
great plains and the opening of the West. At about that time, the United
States ceased being a strictly maritime nation.
The Colonial Period
The coastwise trade opened early in colonial history. In 1627, only
seven years after the first colony was established in Massachusetts Bay, the
Dutch who had meanwhile settled in New Amsterdam, "invited friendly commercial
relations" 16 with the New Englanders. By 1635, a thriving trade was in pro-
gress in tobacco and salt.
During the colonial period American vessels flew the British flag and
were protected in their commercial pursuits by the Royal Navy. British navi-
John G. Glover and William B. Cornell, The Development of American
Industries
.
(New York: Prentice-Hall Co., 1951), p. 721. This work presents
an excellent history of the development of the American merchant marine and its







gat ion laws which protected British-flag shipping to the detriment of foreigners
likewise protected American ships and hindered the shipping of Britain *s arch
rivals, France and Spain. Though the navigation laws nurtured the growth of
both British and American commerce, they were the direct cause of the vicious
naval wars of the late eighteenth century.
The First United States Congress
When the Colonists gained their independence in 1783, American merchant
vessels immediately lost their British nationality and became prey to the Eng-
lish navigation laws. When the First Congress convened, the American-flag
merchant fleet had shrunk to a mere handful of vessels—about the equivalent of
a dozen moderately sized freighters of today.
In its very first Act, the Congress paseed a tariff Act which imposed
discriminatory customs duties on commodities imported in foreign-flag vessels.
The same law granted a ten percent discount on duties if the goods were im-
ported in American-owned vessels. In another law, the Congress imposed high
18Hlight tonnage" taxes on foreign vessels seeking to enter U. S. seaports.
Certainly, nobody could accuse the First Congress of a lack of appreciation for
the merchant mariners* problems. All told, five of the first eleven Acts con-
tained provisions to regulate or encourage the growth of ocean-shipping.
Between the years 1789 and 1630, no less than fifty Acts affecting




"Light Tonnage** is the displacement tonnage of the bare ship, normally




The Repeal of the Navigation Acts
At the end of the War of 1812, Great Britain entered into a treaty with
the United States which initiated the removal of discriminatory navigation laws
by both countries. In the treaty both nations agreed "not to impose discrimina-
tory duties on products carried in trade between the two countries.**19 This
treaty led to similar treaties between the United States and other maritime
nations, aid by 1820, the last of the U. S. and British navigation laws had been
rescinded. Other nations followed suit.
The Civil War and After
American ocean-shipping thrived up until the Civil War, but t he internal
strife shifted the emphasis on trade to the production of munitions. Prior to
the War Between the States, U. S. imports had consisted mainly of manufactured
goods in exchange for exports of cotton, tobacco, iron ore, and agricultural
products. The post-Civil War years saw a great change in the composition of
our exports and imports.
The urgent need for munitions had hastened the industrialization of the
New England and Middle Atlantic states. At the war's end, expended industrial
capacity replaced much of the need for manufactured goods of foreign origin.
International trade in consumer commodities decreased, and our largest import
became human beings—immigrants seeking homes in the Golden West. Investors
became more interested in financing the building of railroads than in building
unprofitable merchant ships. A whole new shipping industry came into existence
on the Great Lakes; the iron ranges of northern Minnesota were being opened;




the road to economic self-sufficiency.
The American merchant marine declined steadily during those years. In
the "gO's" and again in the M70*s w the maritime industries sought relief in the
Halls of Congress, but nothing important resulted. In 1891 the Congress auth-
orized the Postmaster General to enter into contracts with American ship owners
for the carriage of the mail, which brought temporary relief to a moribund
industry. In the lushness of Victorian epicureanism, and lulled by the secur-
ity of Pax Britannica, thoughts of war were far from mind.
When war with Spain came in 1898, the U. S. merchant marine had reached
its lowest point in a century of seafaring. When military operations were
opened in Cuba, "we had virtually no merchant marine; in the support of the
Cuban operation, only one American-flag vessel was used, and that was a passen-
20
ger vessel converted to duty as a hospital ship. Things had indeed reached
a sorry state.' From the necessity of relying on foreign merchant vessels, the
logistic effort was snarled in international red-tape. Too few vessels were
under the operational guidance of the government to support our meager over-
seas offensive.
In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt made a strong plea to Congress
stressing the need for merchant marine development. But his appeal fell on
deaf ears. That same year, the Great White Fleet circled the globe—wit h
foreign colliers supplying the coal.
Shortly after the turn of the century, interest slowly revived in foreign
trade and with it a gradual expansion of the merchant shipping industry. In
1904, an amendment to the Army appropriation act required that "vessels of the
20
U. S. House of Representatives, Waterborne Cargo in United States
Flag Vessels , hearings before the Committee for Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
June, 1954, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 6. See testi-




United States, or belonging to the United States, and no others would be
permitted to transport coal, fodder, or supplies for the use of the Army and
Navy. That law is still in effect today, as will be seen later. But the growth
of the merchant fleet was slow. With war clouds dark over Europe, the spirit
of isolationism ran high here at home. When war finally came to Europe in 1914,
the American merchant marine was woefully inadequate for the tasks which con-
fronted it.
21
33 Stat. 518, Ch. 1766, April 28, 1904.

CHAPTER IV
THE MERCHANT MARINE SUBSIDIES
Direct government assistance to the maritime industry began with the
Shipping Act of 1916. Shocked into action by the prospects of involvement in
the war in Europe, Congress took stock of the American merchant marine and found
the picture a dismal one. Not only had the U. S. flag fleet shriveled to the
point where it was carrying only a paltry nine percent of our foreign commerce,
but the shipbuilding industry had also sunk to an all-time low. American tramps
were almost non-existent. More than nine-tenths of all merchant tonnage was
fitted for coastal or intercoastal service only, and was completely unsuitable
for employment on the high seas.
The purposes of the Shipping Act of 1916 were to "encourage, develop, and
create a naval auxiliary, naval reserve, and a merchant marine in order to meet
the requirements of the commerce of the United States, and to regulate ship-
«22ping. The United States Shipping Board was also created by this Act.
The huge shipbuilding program undertaken under the Act cost more than
$3 billion and produced more than 2,300 ships, none of which was delivered
until after the Armistice. Since all these ships were under government owner-
ship, a new law, the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, was required to enable the
Shipping Board to sell the vessels and transfer ownership to private hands.
Some 1300 vessels passed into private hands under the provisions of the 1920





The 1920 law provided for the establishment of a construction loan fund,
by setting aside Shipping Board Revenues not to exceed $25 million annually
during the five years after the effective date of the Act. Under this pro-
vision, the Board could finance up to two-thirds of the construction cost of a
new ship. The idea was unsuccessful because, even in those days only a small
number of ships could be built for $25 million.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 greatly liberalized the construction
loan provisions of the earlier Act. The loan fund was increased bo $250
millions, and the period of repayment extended to twenty years. Fifty-eight
vessels were constructed under the 1928 statute.
The 1928 Act also set up a system of ocean-mail contracts to aid the
American-flag lines engaged in foreign trade. The compensation provided for
carrying the mail was fixed on a mileage basis with maximum rates varying ac-
cording to size and speed of the ship. It was expected that the rates would
be high enough to permit the maintenance of American-flag services in the face
of foreign competition. The assistance provided to U. s.-flag operators was
substantial. The total cost to the U. S. Treasury during the years 1928-37 was
in excess of $175 million.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 provided the current basis for Construc-
tion and Operating differential subsidies based on a parity concept. The Act
had very broad aims:
Section 101. It is necessary for the national defense and the de-
velopment of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States
shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic
water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne ex-
port and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide
shipping service on all routes essential for maintainir Um low of
such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all timet.., (b)
capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war
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or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United
States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as amy be
practicable, and (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and
most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States,
and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel. It
is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to fos-
ter the development and encourage the maintenance of such a mer-
chant marine. 23
It is worthy of note that Section 1 provided the first precise declara-
tion of the national maritime policy.
The 1^36 Act established the Maritime Commission, replacing the Shipping
Board, and charged it with the responsibility of executing the national policy.
Supplemented by the necessary appropriations, the Act was designed to insure
the construction and maintenance of an American merchant marine adequate for
the foreign trade and for defense.
The Construction-Differential Subsidy
The Federal Maritime Board is authorized to grant aid to citizens of the
United States in the construction, in U. S. shipyards, of new vessels to be
used in the foreign commerce of the United States. Prior to the 1952 amend-
ments to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, such aid was limited to vessels to be
used on essential service, route, or line. The amendments removed that require
ment. Under present law, tramp operators are eligible on the same basis as
liner operators.
In considering an application, the Board must determine that:
(1) The plans and specifications call for a new vessel suitable for
commerce and for national defense.
(2) That the applicant is financially able to build and operate the
vessel.
23
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(3) That the new vessel will replace an obsolete one.
The construction differential subsidy is designed to do two things: (a)
replace old vessels with new, modern ships, and (b) to maintain a nucleus
United States shipbuilding industry.
The Parity Concept
Under the construction subsidy plan, the United States government will
pay the differential between the cost of building a ship in a U. S. shipyard and
the cost of building an equivalent vessel in a foreign yard, not to exceed fifty
percent of the cost. In addition, the government will pay for national defense
features designed and built into the ship. The completed vessel becomes the
private property of the private individual.
The Construction and Repair Division of the Maritime Administration
maintains up-to-date information on foreign shipbuilding costs. Since foreign
ship operators are not anxious to reveal their costs, because there is no pos-
sibility of their getting a contract, much of the task of obtaining this cost
information is done on a personal basis between representatives of the Admin-
istration and the operators of foreign yards. In addition, certain foreign
nationwide economic indices are maintained, such as labor costs, the cost of
living, etc., which provide a statistical basis for cost determination. Since
the procedure for building a ship is the same anywhere, it is possible to build
up estimated costs with a few known facts. The foreign cost estimates deter-
mined by the Board establish the Construction Differential parity.
The plans and specifications for proposed ships must receive Navy De-
partment approval. Defense features which the Navy insists upon are usually
increased propulsive power; additional fresh-water evaporating capacity; shock-
mounting of electrical fixtures; and additional electric-generating capacity.
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Although in the past, the authority to pay for defense features with government
funds has been used to make up differences between parity and the 50% maximum
subsidy, this is not common practice. The cost of defense features is usually
insignificant, rarely amounting to more than $400,000 per vessel. *
There are several financing schemes possible under the Act of 1936. One
plan permits the purchaser to make a down-payment of twenty-five percent of the
estimated foreign cost in cash, with the rest amortized over twenty annual pay-
ments at an interest rate of 3.5%. Under another plan, the government actually
finances the vessel, and sells it to the purchaser after its completion and
acceptance. Under a third plan, the government guarantees a first mortgage on
the ship up to ninety percent of the vessel's sales value, normally eighty-
seven and one-half percent of its U. S, cost excluding defense features. Under
this last plan, the purchaser is able to obtain a seventy-five percent mortgage
through commercial lending institutions. Recently, under pressure from many
quarters, the Maritime Administration has favored the last mentioned plan in
order to place the loans in private hands. That policy has worked to the detri
ment of the program, however, because it means higher interest costs to the
buyer.
Costs in U. S. shipyards are consistently higher than in foreign yards.
A recent survey showed that while a British shipyard utilized about one-fifth
more man hours of labor in the construction of a ship than did American yards,
the basic hourly rate in the American yards is about three and a half times the
British labor rate. Construction costs are about forty to forty-six percent
lower in Japanese and European yards.
24
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The Results of the Program
From the enactment of the program in 1936 down to December 31, 1952. a
total of 247 ships were built under the program. Of oourse, the whole plan
was set aside during the war. During the same period, forty-seven dry cargo
vessels were built in American yards without the subsidy. It is apparent that
the program has secured increased business for U. S. shipyards.
The total cost to the government for construction-differentials amounted
to $426,185,833 for the 247 ships built. Since 1952, three large passenger
liners were constructed, the SS Constitution, SS Independence, and the SS United
States, on which the estimated subsidy payments will total about $230 millions,
but the final figure has not yet been determined.
Current Trends
At the present time, there is an acute shortage of tankers. There are
now a total of 40 tankers under construction in the six private shipyards on
the East Coast, three on the Gulf Coast, and six on the West Coast. There are
also signs that new, more efficient, and more competitive dry-cargo ships will
be needed in the near future. A recent change in attitude by the Maritime
Administration has contributed much to the present success of the program. In
the past too much emphasis was placed on the military features in the design
of merchant ships. Under the present administration, the emphasis is on com-
mercial utility with defense features purely secondary. This, it appears, is
as it should be. The new designs are proving much more popular among American
ship operators. After all, unless it's a ship they can make money with,




Indirect operating subsidies are nearly as old as the shipping industry
itself. Early in American history, the tariff acts provided iaport duty dis-
counts to American-flag merchant vessels. In 1891, by act of Congress, the
Postmaster General was authorized to enter into mail contracts with U. S. ship-
operators. The mail contracts provided the only government assistance to the
merchant marine up until the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
Title VI of the Act of 1936 established the Operating-Differential sub-
sidy program for the direct assistance of U. S. -flag merchant vessels in direct
competition with low-cost foreign shipping. The act is very definitive as to
which vessels, and in what service, are to be entitled to the payments:
The Commission is authorized and directed to consider the application
of any citizen of the United States for financial aid in the operation
of a vessel or vessels, which are to be used in an essential service
in the foreign commerce of the United States. No such application
shall be approved unless (a) the operation of such vessel or vessels
in such service, route, or line is required to meet foreign-flag compe-
tition, and to promote the foreign commerce of the United States, and
that such vessel or vessels were built in the United States or docu-
mented under the laws of the United States (...). 25
It should be noted that the law permits payment of the subsidy only to
vessels in certain essential services. Exactly which services would be eligible
was left to the determination of the Maritime Commission. Also, it should be
noted that the subsidy is payable by voyages, not by vessels or by shipping
lines.
The computation of the government's liability is based upon a parity
scheme. The items of the ship operating costs which are subject to equali-
zation are: (1) insurance, (2) ship maintenance, (3) repairs not compensated
49 Stat. 1985, Sect. 601.
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by insurance, (4) the wages and subsistence of slips' officers and crews, and
(5) any other expense in which the Board finds the American operator to be at
substantial disadvantage with his foreign-flag competitors.
The plan is no clear path to the national treasury. The operator who
receives the benefits aust agree to: (1) the recapture of excess profits over
ten percent of invested capital, (2) the establishment of reserve funds to
insure (a) the replacement of ships by the operator, (b) the prompt payment of
the contractor's obligations to the United States, and (c) the continued main-
tenance and successful operation of the subsidized ship or ships; (3) the use,
whenever practicable, of only articles, materials, and supplies produced in the
United States, and (4) the repair of subsidized ships within the continental
limits of the United States, except for emergency voyage repairs. Furthermore,
the operating-differential contracts stipulate the minimum and maximum number
of voyages to be made by subsidized operators in each designated service.
The tramp operators are not eligible for the operating-differential sub-
sidy by reason of the fact that they seldom, if ever, adhere to schedule, or
travel regular routes.
At the present time, only seventeen American shipping companies have
vessels under operating-differential subsidy contracts.
The Operation of the Subsidy Plan
The operating-differential subsidy plan is almost impossible to adminis-
ter equitably. It is the responsibility of the Maritime Administration to carry
out the provisions of the law. In the first place, in order to establish a
parity level, it is necessary to accumulate an enormous amount of statistical
data on both 11. S. and foreign labor costs, insurance rates, repair costs, and
myriad other cost data. This, in itself, is a tremendous task. From all this
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information, it is necessary to compute parity rates for each trade route. A
total of 994 different rates are currently required to administer the subsidy
program. 2°
And the computation of rates is not the only complication. Before a
payment may be paid for a particular voyage, an audit of the company accounts
is necessary in order to determine the correct differential between parity and
actual costs. If there is disagreement, then there must be hearings and ad-
judications. All in ail, the plan is quite unmanageable.
The problem of budgeting for estimated subsidy payments is a difficult
one. In order to reach any kind of a realistic budget figure, it is necessary
to limit the number of subsidizable Toyages. This shows a major weakness in
the plan. By limiting voyages, the subsidy is retarding the very thing it
seeks to advance
—
participation of American-flag ships in foreign trade.
The out-of-pocket cost to the taxpayers since 1937, not Including the
27
war years when the subsidy was suspended, amounts to about $160 million. •'
However, no attempt has been made to compute the total costs accruing from the
administration of the program. It would be a safe guess that it has cost
nearly as much to administer as the total subsidy payments made so far.
The Results of the Subsidy
There are practically no tankers under the operating-differential subsidy
because almost all the tanker traffic is coastwise, or non-contiguous, or is in
the tramp trade. Subsidized vessels are almost exclusively freighters or com-
bination vessels. Figures 6 and 7 show the number of subsidized and non-subsi-
U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Subsidy Policy , op. cit .. p. 97.
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dized vessels engaged in the foreign trade of the United States as of December
31, 1952.
It will be noted froa Figure 6 that in the total trade, the hauling was
about equally split between the subsidized and non-subsidized ships. Figure 7
shows that the majority of combination vessels (primarily passenger carriers)
are subsidized. The latter case is to be expected since a large percentage of
the combination vessels* business consisted of hauling passengers.
The Department of Commerce report to the President entitled "American
Merchant Marine and the Federal Tax Policy"28 throws light on the actual value
of the operating-subsidy program to the ocean-shipping industry. The report
indicates that for the six years, 1946 through 1951, the subsidized companies
earned an average of 12.3% return on net worth, while the subsidized companies
earned only 5.7%. "During this period, federal taxes absorbed 46% of the oper-
ating profits of the non-subsidized companies compared with about 26% of the
20
subsidized earnings.
It would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that the subsidy payments
contributed an average of 6.6% to the earning of the subsidized lines. The
true answer lies in the tax structure as it applies to subsidized lines in con-
trast to non-subsidized lines. The subsidized lines are subject to tax exemp-
tions on reserve funds required to be set up under the law.^ The non-subsi-
dized companies receive no such advantage. The real advantage, it appears,
accrues from the tax exemptions, not from the subsidy payment.
Inefficiency in operation tends to increase the cost of the subsidy to
28
Ibid ., pp. 144-45.
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the government. In its report to the President in 1952, the Maritime Adminis-
tration made the recommendation that steps should be taken to insure the more
efficient use of shipboard labor, the most significant element of operating
cost. Non-subsidized operators must be efficient or perish.
Evaluation of the Program
It is not readily evident that the Operating-Differential Subsidy pro-
gram has been a success. About half the freighter fleet, a quarter of the com-
bination-vessel fleet, and all of the tanker fleet are conducting profitable
operations without the subsidy, though their profits have not been high enough
to attract much additional private capital. We can conclude that the subsidy
program is actually keeping operators in the industry that might otherwise not
be in it, and thus reducing the profits of the non-subsidized companies. If
the plan is keeping ship owners in business, then it is achieving its objective.
But it seems to be an extravagantly expensive way of doing so.
Summary
The Construction-Differential Subsidy Plan which started in earnest in
1936, appears to be a reasonable success at a fairly reasonable cost to the tax-
payers. The plan appears to be achieving its end of maintaining a nucleus ship-
building industry and it appears to be moving in the direction of overcoming the
threat of block obsolescense.
The Operating-Differential Subsidy has been of dubious benefit to the
merchant fleet. Undoubtedly it has kept some companies in business, but there
is a question whether or not they deserve to be. Tax policy seems to yield
more benefits than do the subsidy payments. ironi<*plly, the subsidy is not
applicable to tramps which are in most serious threat of bankruptcy. The idea
.
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of applying the principle to the tramp trade has been advanced, but just now
it could be administered has not been explained. The operating differential
subsidy itself is difficult and expensive to administer when only regularly
scheduled voyages are involved. How it could be economically applied to the
haphazard operations of the tramps is anybody's guess.

CHAPTER V
THE CONTROL OF COMPETITION AND
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
Fair Trade on the High Seas
Shipping conferences are among the earliest cartels in interna-
tional trade. Shipping conferences, or rings as they are sometimes
called, are agreements organized by shipping lines to restrict or
eliminate competition, to regulate and rationalize sailing schedules
and ports of call, and, occasionally, to arrange for the pooling of
cargo, freight monies, or net earnings. They generally control
prices, i.e., freight rates and passenger fares.*51
Some of the shipping rings have been conferences quite literally— infor-
mal oral agreements—but many have utilized written agreements, and employed
full time secretariats, consummating written contractural arrangements which
bind each member to the agreement, sometimes by cash performance bond.
Shipping conferences are ordinarily organized by geographic areas to
cover particular trade groups. The areas involved cover the principal trading
areas of the world. As of January 18, 1950, the foreign trade of the United
States included conference agreements in nine different areas of export or im-
port, numbering thirty-three different routes. These routes involved no less
than 133 different freight, or passenger rate, agreements.^
There is, naturally, much over-lapping between conferences. Individual
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shipping lines may be parties to one or several conferences, depending upon the
area in which they trade.
The basic purpose of shipping conferences is to minimize losses and maxi-
mize profits. Historically, most conference agreements were prompted by the
necessity of stopping, or at least avoiding, the insanity of cut -throat compe-
tition. It takes little imagination to visualize the chaos which would resjlt
if all shipping in the international trade, where no one government could exer-
cise control, were on a strictly competitive basis*
In short, the conference system provides a method for the self-
regulation of an industry most of which is subject to the multiple
jurisdiction of several sovereign nations with disparate legal codes
and diverse commercial practices. 30
Conference Methods of Controlling Competition
The shipping conferences control competition by the use of one or more
of the following means: (1) rate agreements, (2) control of sailing schedules,
(3) pooling of freight, and (4) "good faith" performance bonds. Certain other
methods have been, and still are used in the foreign trade of some nations,
though they are not permitted in the U. S, trades: (1) discriminatory agree-
ments, (2) the use of "fighting ships," (3) delayed rebates; and, (4) tying
agreements with shippers. These last techniques were used to minimize compe-
tition from outsiders.
Rate agreements usually consist of three types, providing for either
fixed, minimum, or differential rates over particular routes for certain classes
of cargo or passengers. Variation from the set rate can only be achieved by
approval of all conferees. Ordinarily, rates are set to provide a satisfactory
'gin of profit to the highest-cost operators.
Ibid ., p. 4.
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Differential rates are customary in agreements covering passenger rates,
because of the variations in services and accomodations offered to passengers
on different sbips.
The control of sailing schedules is another method used to control compe
tition between members. Sometimes the total number of sailings each member is
permitted during a year is stipulated. Occasionally, the dates of sailing are
subject to agreement, while others restrict the ports of call which can be
served by each member.
There are a variety of pooling arrangements, but they can be roughly
classified as agreements to: (1) pool available vessels; (2) pool available
freight and passenger traffic; or (3) pool gross freight or passenger monies
and divide net proceeds among the members of the conference. Some agreements
restrict the operations of shipping lines to certain areas. For example, the
Watson Lines and the Dollar Line have an agreement which reserves all freight
and surface passengers in the Hawaiian Islands trade to Matson, while all Far
East and Orient trade is reserved for the Dollar Line. However, if Efetsor. does
haul cargo to Hawaii which is ultimately bound for the Orient, then they must
pay over all net receipts to the Dollar Lice.
Such agreements are permitted among the D. S. carriers because they do
not restrict the operations of other parties who may be engaged in the Pacific
trade.
While the Shipping Act of 1916 permitted D. S.-flag shipping lines to
enter into conference agreements, the law specifically forbad the use of "fight
ing ships'* and deferred rebates.
^
A "fighting ship" is a vessel placed on berth by the conference to sail
*rhe Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat 728, Section 14.
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in competition with a non-conference carrier. By sailing such a ship on the
same day, or possibly bracketing the competitor's vessel with two "fighting"
vessels, non-conference competition was effectively discouraged. Often, the
technique involved rate-cutting as well, which made the practice vicious and
unethical.
Deferred rebates refer to "under-the-table" commissions to freight agents
for reserving cargo exclusively for the vessels of a particular line. It has
been common practice in many countries for agents to accept such commission,
but it is now illegal in the United States trade.
Governmental Investigation
The operation of international shipping cartels came under investigation
in both the 0. S. and Britain in the early years of the present century. In
1906 a Royal Commission conducted a thorough investigation into their operations
and the Alexander Subcommittee of the House Committee for Merchant Marine and
Fisheries conducted a thorough probe In 1911. It is remarkable that the find-
ings of the two groups were essentially the same. Both stressed the improve-
ment in service that resulted from (1) the greater regularity of sailings,
and (2) the improved ships that were made possible by the greater security
which the conferences gave to capital invested in the steamship business. There
was also agreement that the conference system provided greater stability to
rates, a condition which all agreed was essential to the sound development of
trade, provided the rates themselves were not excessive.
Prior to 1916, several suits were brought against U. S. shipping lines
by the U. S. government for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by partici-
pating in shipping cartels. None of these suits ever reached the adjudication
stage. Chiefly on the basis of the report by the Alexander Committee, Congre&s
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specifically exempted the shipping lines from the provisions of the anti-trust
laws and authorized their participation in shipping conferences so long as the
agreements were published and filed with the Shipping Board.
Undoubtedly, the conference system has some shortcomings. The pooling
of freight may result in overtonnage on certain routes. Also, a dual-rate sys-
tem which allows lower rates to companies agreeing to employ conference shippers
exclusively for given periods, restricts the freedom of action of individual
shipping companies. But in the main, the system has been successful and has
provided dependable service at reasonable rates. The consensus of opinion in
American shipping circles is that the conferences do more good than harm. 35
U. S. Governmental Regulation
Nearly every aspect of the United States-flag ocean shipping industry is
now under some form of governmental regulation. Technical inspections are
handled by the Steamboat Inspection Service; navigation practices and safety at
sea are supervised by the Coast Guard; import duties are imposed by the Customs
and Immigration Service; communications by the Federal communications Commission,
and so it goes. The regulation of rates and commercial practices are under the
jurisdiction of the Maritime Administration and the Inter-State Commerce Com-
mission.
The earliest legislation directly regulating the rates and practices of
water carriers was the Shipping Act of 1916, which provided for the supervision
of common carriers operating on regular routes on the high seas and the Great
Lakes, in the foreign trade of the U. S. , and in both interstate and non-con-
tiguous domestic trade. Supervision was also provided for other persons carry-
35
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ing on the business of forwarding freight or furnishing wharfage, dock, ware-
house, or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by
water on the high seas or Great Lakes. «&
The administration of the law of 1916, and the issuance of proper rules
and regulations, the Congress invested in the United States Shipping Board.
The Shipping Board continued in operation until it was disestablished by the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and replacdd by the Maritime Commission, which, in
turn, was succeeded by the Maritime Administration under the Reorganization
Act of 1950.
The Act of 1916 declared certain practices of the shipping rings to be
illegal in the trade of the United States, At the same time, the law permitted
U. S, shipping lines to join such conferences, providing in Section 15 that:
every common carrier by water
. . .
shall file immediately with the
board a true copy, or if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of
every agreement with another such carrier ... to which it may be
a party
. . .
fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares,
[and] controlling or regulating competition; pooling or apportion-
ing earnings; or otherwise regulating sailings between ports. **
If the Board found that such agreements were not unduly discriminatory to non-
conference shippers, the agreements were allowed to stand.
It is noteworthy that the rules set down in the Act of 1916 apply to all
vessels participating in the U. S. trade, both national and foreign. This also
applies to the filing of agreements. The U. S. government reserves the right
to deny entry or departure clearance to the ship of any nation which fails to
comply with the laws.
Today, the Maritime Administration does not actually control water-ship-
ping rates in foreign trade. However, the Administration does require that all
°°39 Stat. 728 (1*17), 40 Stat. 900 (1919), 46 USC, Art 801 (1940).
37The Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 728, Sect. 15.
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rates be filed with the Department of Commerce, and the Maritime Administration
has the right to review rates to determine their reasonableness. Over the years,
the Shipping **oard and its successors have determined standards of reasonable-
ness which are calculated to yield a satisfactory profit to the operators.
Pooling is allowed under present law. In 1939 the Commission upheld an
agreement to pool earnings in the United States North Atlantic -German run, be-
cause the result of the agreement was effective control of destructive compe-
tition without introducing unfair discrimination or being detrimental to foreign
commerce. Other pool agreements have been disapproved because they work to the
detriment of the industry as a whole.
The Maritime Administration exercises only indirect control over con-
ference shipping rates through its power to approve or disapprove conference
agreements. If the conference rates appear to be unreasonable, and cannot be
defended by the conferees, then the agreement can be disapproved.
In general it car. be said that the Maritime Administration and its prede-
cessors have been successful in correcting unreascnable discrimination a nd some
other abuses, and in restricting the growth of monopoly in the marine shipping
industry. The fact that conferences have been required to keep an open member-
ship policy has placed a potent restraint on their misuse.
Summary
The ocean-shipping industry, particularly in the liner trade, has suc-
ceeded in regulating itself through the use of international shipping confer-
ences. While these conferences tend toward monopoly, this tendency has been
kept in check, at least in the U. S. foreign trade, by aggressive U. S# laws
requiring that the agreements be approved by the Maritime Administration and
that membership remain open to any ship operator desiring to join. The confer-
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ences have done more good than bad, and have brought order out of chaos.
Formal 0. S. government regulation of shipping in the U. S, trade began
with the Shipping Act of 1916. Congress placed a tremendous amount of power in
the hands of the Shipping Board and its successors which power has been used to
the overall benefit of the industry. In 1936, the administration of domestic
trade was placed under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In conjunction with the cabotage laws, to be discussed in Chapter VI, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission now exercises close control over water-borne domestic
commerce.
It is felt that some government control of this vital industry is nec-
essary for the good of international trade. Present regulatory legislation ap-
pears to be accomplishing its purposes.

CHAPTER VI
THE RESERVATION OF COASTWISE TRADE
The Cabotage Regulations
The first Act of the First United States Congress in the year 1763, con-
cerned protective tariffs. The law provided for high import duties on commodi-
ties imported in ships of foreign flag, and a discount on import duty for com-
modities imported in American-flag vessels. An 1617 Act specifically reserved
domestic commerce to vessels of American ownership and registry. The Act de-
clared that all coastwise and domestic shipping of the United States would be
transported in vessels built and registered in the United States, owned and
operated by citizens of the United States.
Present cabotage regulations, which reserve all coastwise, inter-coastal,
and non-contiguous water-borne traffic to transportation in U. S. bottoms, are
a combination of law and administrative regulations issued by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Maritime Administration. Basically, they are
founded upon the Act of 1817, as further amended by Acts of 1686 and 1920.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provides the most recent expression of
the attitude of Congress toward this important segment of the water-borne ship-
ping industry:
No merchandise shall be transported by water, or by land and water,
on penalty of forfeiture thereof, between points in the United States,
. . .
either directly or via a foreign port, or for any part of the
transportation, in any other vessel than a vessel built in and docu-




are citizens of the United States. 38
Sections 18 and 22 of the Act permitted the Shipping Board to allow cer-
tain foreign vessels to operate in the trade of the Philippine Islands and Cana-
dian vessels to operate in the trade of Alaska.
The United States is not alone in the principle of cabotage. It can be
categorically stated that every maritime nation in the world reserves its domes-
tic water-borne commerce to vessels of its own nationality.
The participation of foreign-built or registered vessels also extends
into the fields of towing and dredging. Except in emergency, a foreign-built
or foreign registered tug is forbidden to tow any vessel in United States terri-
torial waters. Under a law of 1906, a foreign-built or foreign-owned dredge is
forbidden to dredge in United States waters.
The cabotage laws and regulations are very restrictive to foreign vessels
entering U. S. waters. If, for example, a British ship outbound from Europe
lands half its cargo in New York with the remainder destined for New Orleans,
that vessel cannot reload the vacant space with U. £. -owned cargo bound for
that port. She can reload for a foreign port, but not for another U. S. port,
or even a port in a U. S. possession or territory.
In the coastwise domestic trade, the merchant marine competes with the
railroads and motor trucks. In order to eliminate cut-throat competition, the
Interstate Commerce Comisssion has established rate schedules to favor one or
the other means of transportation in certain areas and certain types of cargoes.
For example, due to the rate schedules, it would be altogether uneconomical to
move petroleum products from Texas to New Jersey by rail—tankers can do it
much cheaper. Interstate Commerce rules prevent rate-cutting by the railroads
38
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Sect. 27, 41 Stat. 988.
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to steal any portion of the merchant marine's tanker business.
The size of the fleet engaged in domestic and non-contiguous trade is
about half the size of the foreign-trade fleet. In 1952 a total of 478 vessels
were engaged in domestic trade, 306, or nearly 65% were tankers, and the rest
freighters. There is very little coastwise passenger service due to the rela-
tively high Interstate Commerce passenger rates on ships. The major portion of
the coastwise trade consists of petroleum movements from the Gulf of Mexico to
East Coast ports of the United States. Again, 1952, a total of 356 vessels
were engaged in strictly coastwise trade, 294 of which were tankers. In that
same year, only 57 vessels were engaged in intercoastal trade via the Panama
Canal and most of which (49) were dry-cargo freighters. Relatively little
petroleum is moved from the Gulf to the West Coast; most of the west coast crude
oil originates in California.
The non-contiguous trade between U.S. ports and possessions or terri-
tories is relatively small. In 1952, only 65 vessels of one thousand gross tons
or over were engaged in such trade.
In the past, coastwise vessels were limited by their design to that pur-
pose alone. However, that is not now the case. With few exceptions, steamships
engaged in domestic trade are now equally fitted to participate in foreign trade
or serve as naval auxiliaries if the need arises. Thus the cabotage laws and
regulations have served to bolster the size of the merchant marine for defense
purposes.
Vessels engaged in domestic trade are not eligible for the operating-
differential subsidy, nor for the construction-differential subsidy. The
cabotage regulations provide sufficient assurance of their cargoes, and ships




Coastwise shipping has increased steadily since the last War, chiefly in
the tanker trade. Domestic freighter traffic has tended to decrease slightly,
but the increase in the demand for the transportation of petroleum has more
than offset the decrease in dry-cargo movements.
The domestic water-shipping industry is considered, by the Department of
Commerce, to be in good health. The fleet is large enough to meet commercial
needs, new vessels (particularly tankers) are being built and the future out-
look is favorable. The coastal shipping fleet appears to be the most pros-




The United States is the first nation to return to the principle of cargo
preference as a matter of national shipping policy. However, it is important
to understand that the new cargo preference policy is limited to U. S. govern-
ment owned or financed cargoes. Cargo preference does not extend to purely
commercial freight, even though many European nations have chosen to claim that
it does.
American subsidy policy has drawn few complaints from other maritime
nations and cabotage is an established international practice—every maritime
nation regulates international water-borne commerce within its own territorial
waters. But recent U. S. cargo preference legislation has drawn heavy fire
from foreign shores. Much of the criticism is ill-deserved and inspired by
nationalistic desires for economic gain.
It is onla natural that foreign maritime nations such as Britain, Norway,
Sweden, and Japan should be sensitive to U. S. legislation which affects their
merchant fleets. International shipping is an important part of their econ-
omies. To the United States, though the merchant marine is important as a
defense facility, and as a stabilizing influence inthe shipping market, it is
but a small segment of the whole economy.
To foreign nations our national maritime policy seems inconsistent. On
the other hand we are granting billions in foreign aid and on the other we are





Historically, the first recurrence of the cargo preference principle ap-
peared as an amendment to the U. S. Army appropriation act of 1904. That amend-
ment decreed:
vessels of the United States, or belonging to the United States, and
no other, shall be employed in the transportation by sea of coal, pro-
visions, fodder, or supplies of any description, purchased pursuant to
law, for the use of the Army or Navy . . .^
Through practice, this law has come to be applied On the basis that at
least half of such traffic should be reserved for U. S.-flag commercial vessels.
On the basis of the statute of 1904, it has been policy since that time
to transport at least fifty percent of the cargoes in the logistic support of
the armed forces in privately-owned U, S.-flag merchant ships.
The next piece of legislation relating to preferential treatment of the
merchant marine with regard to government -owned cargoes came in 1934. Shortly
after the Reconstruction Finance Corporation began operation. Congress announced
Joint Resolution Number 17 which stated:
that it is the sense of Congress that in any loans made by the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation or any other instrumentality of the
Government to foster the exporting of agricultural or other products,
provision shall be made that such products shall be carried exclusi-
vely in vessels of the United States
. . ,
40
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 regislated in favor of the preferential
treatment of the U. S. Merchant Marine in the transportation of government of-
ficials traveling abroad:
Any officer or employee of the United States traveling on official
business overseas or to or from any of the possessions of the United
States shall travel and transport his personal effects on ships regis-
3933 Stat. 51P. Ch. 1766, April 28, 1904.
40Public Resolution 17 (73d Congress), March 26, 1934.
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tered under the laws of the United States . . . 41
During the early post-war years, foreign aid became a major part of
ocean cargoes. With foreign merchant marine fleets heavily decimated as a re-
sult of the war, the American merchant fleet carried a large portion of the
cargoes. As foreign merchant fleets began to recuperate, especially with the
surplus ships sold to foreign owners under the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946,
competition revived. Seeking to preserve the position of our own commercial
fleet. Congress took particular care to include preferential cargo provisions
in every Act granting aid to foreign countries. Provisions to the effect that
at least 50 percentum of the gross tonnage of commodities procured
out of the funds made available under [this Act] and transported
to or from the United States on Ocean vessels
. . .
shall be trans-
ported on privately-owned United States-Flag vessels
. .
.**
Each of the following laws, all relating to foreign aid, contained pro-
visions similar to the one quoted above:
(a) Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and amendments
(b) Korean Aid Act (Far Eastern Assistance Act), P. L. 447, 81st CongreS
(c) Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950
(d) India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951
(e) Mutual Security Acts of 1951, 1952, and 1953
(f
)
Pakistan Wheat Act of 1950
(g) Emergency Agricultural Commodities Assistance Act of 1954
(h) Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
By 195<s, cargo preference with respect to governmertVowned or financed
cargoes, had become a standard policy with the Congress.
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, Title IX, Section 901.
42
ECA Amendments of 1949, PL 47, 81st Congress, Sec. 6(a).
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The Cargo Preference Act of 1954
On August 26, 1954, the Congress enacted permanent legislation guaran-
teeing preferential treatment of the United States merchant marine in the
transportation of government -owned or government -financed commodities. This
Act was known as the Cargo Preference Act of 1954, Public Law 664. The Act
has commonly been called the "50-50 Law. w
Public Law 664 was an amendment to Section 901 of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 which applied only to the transportation of officers or employees
of the government on official businesses. 4^ The amendment provided as follows
Section 901 (b):
Whenever the United States shall procure, contract for, or other-
wise obtain for its own account, or shall furnish to or for the ac-
count of any foreign nation without provision for reimbursement, any
equipment, materials, or commodities, within or without the United
States, or shall advance funds or credits or guarantee the converti-
bility of foreign currencies in connection with t he furnishing of
such equipment, materials, or commodities, the appropriate agency
shall take such steps as may be necessary and practicable to assure
that at least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage of such equipment,
materials, or commodities (computed separately for dry bulk carriers,
dry cargo liners, and tankers), which may be transported on ocean
vessels shall be transported on privately owned United States-flag
commercial vessels, to the extent such vessels are available at fair
and reasonable rates for United States-flag commercial vessels, in
such manner as will insure a fair and reasonable participation of
United States-flag commercial vessels in such cargoes by geographic
areas: provided . That the provisions of this subsection may be waived
whenever the Congress by concurrent resolution or otherwise, or the
President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense declares
that an emergency exists justifying a temporary waiver of the pro-
visions of Section 901(b) and so notifies the appropriate agency
or agencies: And provided further . That the provisions of this sub-
section shall not apply to cargoes carried in the vessels of the l-aname
Ganal Company. Nothing herein shall repeal or otherwise modify the
provisions of Public Resolution Number 17, Seventy-third Congress (48
Stat 500), as amended. 44
43„ . nSee page 52.
44
Public Law 664, 63d Congress, approved August 26, 1954.
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The law applies in four kinds of situations: (1) where the United
States procures, contracts, or otherwise obtains for its own account equipment,
materials, or commodities; (2) furnishes equipment, materials, or commodities
to or for the account of any foreign nation without provision for reimbursement;
(3) advances funds or credits; or (4) guarantees the convertibility of foreign
currencies in connection with the furnishing of such equipment or materials.
It has no application to purely commercial transactions where a broker or ex-
porter sells to a firm abroad without the participation of the U. S. government.
The Butler Committee, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee for Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, stated the purpose of the law: "The urgent need
of the American Merchant Marine is for cargoes—and it is this need that S-3233
is designed to meet."45
Opposition to the Proposed Law
Opposition to the proposed amendment to Section 901 of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 was relatively superficial. Some reaction came from foreign
maritime nations, but most opposition came from the executive branch of the
government, namely the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the
Foreign Operations Administration. The General Services Administration, which
is charged with the procurement of stockpile strategic materials and to whose
operations the off-shore procurement provisions of the Act would apply, regis-
tered no significant opposition. The Department of Agriculture indicated it
had no interest in the proposed law.
The Department of Defense's opposition to the proposed extension of
50-50 coverage was expressed by Vice Admiral F. C. Denebrink, the Commander of
45
U. S. Senate, Report No. 1584, June 11, 1954, p. 6.
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the Military Sea Transportation Service. He protested that "the bill contains
no savings clause with reference to the national security . . . there is no
stipulation for providing for liberalization of its terns even in the event of
war or national emergency. ° The Admiral went on to say: Hin the interest of
national security, the Department of Defense cannot accept restrictions, actual
or implied, which would adversely affect its control of military logistic
support including ocean transportation."
In order to overcome Defense's objections, the committee inserted the
emergency proviso in the hill which provided for the waiver of its requirements
in the event of war or national emergency. This satisfied the Department.
The Department of State objected on the basis that the bill would invite
foreign nations to discriminate against American-flag vessels and thus, in the
long run, be detrimental to American shipping. Mr. Thorsten V. Kilajarvi,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, introduced copies of Aide
Memoirs from nine different European maritime nations all of which alluded to
the precedent which the bill would establish, and containing veiled threats of
retaliation. The tenor of the following notes are typical:
From Norway:
The recurrent appearance of more and more restrictive legislation in
the shipping field is considered by the Norwegian Government to embody
a very dangerous tendency, not only in its direct effect on the oper-
ational conditions of international shipping but also because of the
precedent it establishes and because it encourages similar measures
by other countries. 47
"U, S. House of Representatives, Waterborn Cargoes in United States -
flag Vessels . Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,






The measures provided in the bill, when set into force, will undoubt-
edly deliver an unfortunate example to other countries and encourage
them to promote restrictions with the result that the free commeraial
intercourse would severely be hampered. 4°
From Britain:
The United States Government will not have overlooked the probability
that these proposals, if adopted, would undoubtedly encourage the in-
troduction by other countries of similar discriminatory shipping meas-
ures to an extent far greater than those now existing.***
And so it went.
To fully appreciate the grave concern of foreign nations, one must re-
member that, by 1954, stiff competition had returned to the world shipping in-
dustry. Not only was the American merchant fleet feeling the sting of foreign
competition, but competition among the foreigners themselves had reached severe
proportions. The foreign maritime nations were categorically opposed to any-
thing that would magnify the problems of their own shipping industries.
The Foreign Operations Administration's objections to the proposal were
founded on the basis that the law would be extremely difficult to administer.
As Mr. Arthur B. Syran, Director of the Office of Transportation pointed out,
"the extension of the 50-50 rule to so-called offshore procurement for foreign















Proponents of the Amendment
The marine shipping industry through its five major trade associations
was unanimously in favor of the bill. The United States Chamber of Commerce,
the maritime labor unions, and the shipbuilding industry, whole-heartedly en-
dorsed the proposal. All of these organizations, for their own reasons, were
anxious to see temporary cargo preference written into permanent law.
The Law Passed Without Debate
The Committee of both Houses of Congress reported favorably on the bill.
On August 26, 1954, the bill passed both Houses without debate, and the Presi-
dent approved it.
Cargo Preference and the Agricultural Surplus Disposal Program
The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1054, Public
Law 480, 83d Congress, provided for the sale, by the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion, of surplus agricultural commodities to foreign nations at a price near
to the Corporation's cost. An important element of the Act was the fact that
the CCC, as the government's agent, was authorized to sell directly to foreign
importers, without working through the foreign government, aid could accept
foreign currency in payment. This provision had the important effect of re-
moving the dollar-exchange obstacle from the transactions. Upon receiving
foreign currency, the CCC would then deposit the foreign currency in a bank
within the country, to the U. S. government's account. Approximately half the
proceeds were to be loaned to the foreign government on a long-term, low in-
terest basis, and the remainder was to be spent within the country by the
United States. The law provided that $1.5 billion in agricultural surplus
commodities be disposed of in this manner. It amounted to selling the com-
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modities to foreigners, and then letting them keep the money.
The Congress foresaw difficulties in the administration of the Act with
regard to transportation in high-cost U. S. -flag commercial vessels and so it
provided that the differential costs between 0. S. and foreign freight rates
would be borne by the 0. S. government. So far as the purchaser was concerned,
it could cost no more to ship in an American vessel than in a foreign-flag
vessel.
In a ruling of December 15, 1954, the Attorney General declared that
since Title I of Public Law 480 guaranteed the convertibility of foreign cur-
rencies, and since the 50-50 law specifically related to transactions involving
the conversion of foreign currencies, then all shipments of agricultural surplus
commodities came under the 50-50 provisions. The Department of Agriculture,
which had heretofore been silent on the 50-50 principle, immediately set up a
terrific howl. The hue and cry was picked up by foreign shipping interests who
claimed that, by permitting an agency of the U. S. government to deal directly
with foreign private citizens, the transactions took on the color of purely
commercial dealings. The foreigners insisted that the 0. S. had returned to the
long-dead principle of discriminating against foreign shipping in the commercial
trade.
The House Committee for Merchant Marine and Fisheries held extensive
51hearings on the administration of the 50-50 law, particularly as it related
to the agricultural program, in February, 1955, and again in January-February,
1956. The hearings of February, 1955 were touched off by a newspaper article
51
U. S. Senate, Report No. 1584 . op. cit .. also; U. S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Operation and Administration of the Cargo Preference Act . Hearings
before the House Committee for Merchant Marine and Fisheries, January 31 & Feb-
ruary 1-16, 1956, (Washington, D, C. : Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 601.
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which appeared in the Washington Post and Times Herald on January 31, 1955
:
52
The administration's program for selling farm surpluses overseas
is running into a bottleneck because of a ship-American provision in
the new law, informed sources said yesterday. *3
They said the Department is having trouble finding space on Amer-
ican vessels for nearly $60 million worth of commodities already under
contract for shipment abroad.
The hearings sought to determine: (1) whether or not there was a short-
age of shipping to handle the agricultural products; and (2) was there justi-
fication in the allegation that the Cargo Preference law was causing delays in
the execution of the surplus disposal program.
The Department of Agriculture presented a pitifully weak case. Their
whole argument was based on the facts that: (1) Denmark had refused to
negotiate a contract because Danish-flag vessels could not haul the majority of
the cargo; (2) that extra shipping costs in U. S. -flag vessels bad cost the
Department $3 millions more than shipping would have cost in foreign-flag
vessels. With the whole $1.5 billion program more than sixty-five percent com-
plete in less than a third of the time allotted by the law, there was no de-
fensible ground in the claim that cargo-preference was a bottleneck. Repre-
sentatives of the shipping industry showed that the personal income tax return
alone of the personnel involved by the tramp ships engaged in the transportation
more than compensated the U. S. government for the freight differentials accru-
ing feom the use of American-flag ships.
But the Department of Agriculture kept trying. In the Agricultural Act
of 1956 which was vetoed by President Eisenhower on April 16, 1956, a provision
was inserted which would exempt overseas shipments of agricultural commodities
Washington Post Times Herald, January 31, 1955, UP Release by
Patricia Wiggins.
53The informed source was obviously the Department of Agriculture.
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from the 50-50 law. After bitter debate on the floor of the Senate54 the pro-
vision was defeated by a vote of 57 to 23.
Foreign Reaction to 50-50
Foreign maritime nations are not the Hclean-livingH characters they aould
like to pretend to be. Though no foreign nations have resorted to direct sub-
sidy or direct legislation with respect to cargo preference, they have for
years indulged in discriminatory practices affecting the operations of foreign-
flag shipping. During the 81st Congress, the Committee for <4erchant Marine and
Fisheries published a report on aids to shipping practiced by foreign govern-
ments. On pages fourteen through sixteen of the report, there are listed forty
different methods used by foreign nations to grant preferential treatment to
their national-flag shipping. These practices range from tax relief to cur-
rency manipulation. Morally, the foreigners are on thin ice when they criticize
United States maritime policy.
At the present time it appears that retaliatory acts by foreign parlia-
ments, in response to the 0. S. Cargo Preference Act, have failed to materialize
except in Brazil and Saudi Arabia. It is not considered likely that the Brazil-*
ian law will stand for long, and King Ibn Saud's agreement with a Greek ship
operator to ship at least fifty percent of Arabia's crude oil in the Greek's
vessels, affects the British merchant marine much more than ours. It is doubt-
ful if any nation will choose to slug it out toe-to-toe with the United States
on the cargo preference issue. Since American aims are not to monopolize the
ocean shipping trade, it is clear that U. S. policy will not interfere with
foreign shippers to any great extent. Fifty-fifty only applies to cargoes in
54
See The Congressional Record . March 19, 1956, pp. 4408-25.
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which the government is involved and that tonnage is steadily decreasing.
Difficulties in Administration
The 50-50 law has probably had greater impact on the Department of De-
fense than any other executive department of the government, for Defense pro-
curement and distribution are world-wide in scope. Certain difficulties in
interpretation have complicated the problem of administration of cargo prefer-
eece: (1) the act specifies that "at least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage
shall be transported on American-flag vessels; (2) that the gross tonnage shall
be "computed separately for bulk carriers, dry-cargo lines, and tankers"; and
(3) that it shall be administered by "geographic areas."
Gross tonnage is not a measure of cargo, but of ship cargo-carrying
capacity. Cargo is ordinarily measured in long-tons. Freight rates are
usually on the basis of long-ton miles. The question immediately arose: did
Congress intend that the law be administered on the basis of tons or ton miles?
When the relative lengths of voyages are considered, it makes a great deal of
difference.
The requirement that gross tonnage be computed separately for bulk, dry,
and liquid cargoes has made it necessary that an extensive system of reporting
be established to insure that the law is being complied with. It appears easy
at first glance, but when the outer shell is pealed off, real difficulties show
up. How is the question of which cargoes are to be shipped commercially to be
determined? If two shiploads of petroleum are being shipped from Persia to
Japan, must one go in a commercial vessel? If the Act requires transportation
in 0. S. privately-owned vessels, the administration would be relatively easy,
but under the 50-50 requirement, the division of cargo becomes very difficult.
A few cases which point out the difficulty of administration of the law

62
are presented as examples.
If a U. S. aircraft manufacturer, under contract for airplanes for the
Air Force, buys aluminum in Germany (where aluminum is cheap), his purchases are
subject to 50-50 transportation requirements because he is under a cost-plus-
fixed-fee contract, and government funds are involved. Supposing his purchase
amounts to a whole shipload, and he is anxious to keep shipping costs as low as
possible. Must he split his shipment between a U. S.-flag and a foreign-flag
vessel? If he does so, he would be subject to less-full-load rates which are
much higher than full-cargo rates, which is an economically unsound practice.
Must he ship the full load via U. S.-flag ship, or may be ship it all on a
foreign vessel, and ship a later purchase in an American ship? These are the
type of questions which confront administrators of the statute.
Where off-shore procurement is involved, freight costs become very im-
portant. If government money is involved in any way, a contractor must consider
the cargo preference aspect in his purchases. Naturally, bids are higher where
U. S.-flag shipping is required, which means ultimately higher costs to the
government. It amounts to indirect subsidization of American-flag shipping
through various government programs.
Petroleum purchases are a major segment of defense purchases and most
petroleum products originate overseas. The Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing
Agency (ASPPA) buys and distributes all petroleum products for the armed forces.
Under the Act of 1904, and Public Resolution No. 17, all such purchases must be
transported in either U. S. -owned, or 0. S.-flag privately-owned vessels. MSTS
tankers move about 52% of the POL products and U. S. commercial tankers about
48%. Under the two laws cited above, ASPPA has a certain amount of leeway where
ocean transportation is not involved. In order to purchase certain products.
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such as aviation gasoline for the support of Air Force units in Europe, ASP?A
normally purchases through local markets within the foreign country concerned.
This practice results in considerable economy to the U. S. government, both in
direct cost and in the large capital investment which would be required if the
government provided its own facilities. Furthermore, the practice provides
revenues to the local economies which the United States has been trying des-
perately to reinforce since the beginning of the Marshall Plan. However, under
strict interpretation of the Cargo Preference Act this practice would have to
be discontinued since the end product is to be purchased with government funds,
then the component products are also subject to 50-50 transportation. This
would have the unfortunate effects of (1) increasing the direct cost of pur-
chases by ASPPA; (2) requiring vast capital investment in storage facilities;
and, (3) taking much-needed business out of the local economies which we, on
the other hand, are trying to assist. If the Congressional Committees choose
to apply the 50-50 law in this extreme—and well they might—the result could
be seriously detrimental to our defense and foreign aid programs.
These, and many other examples are occurring under the Cargo Preference
Act of 1954.
In order to satisfy the requirements for distribution by geographic
areas, the Military Sea Transport Service divided the world into twenty shipping
areas. Since the law applies to cross trade as well as direct trade, this
means that there are 20 x 20, or 400 different routes which must be administered
separately to meet the requirements of the law. The number of bookkeepers and
clerks required for this operation amounts to a considerable addition to the
federal payroll.
There appears to be no easy, cheap way to administer this law. There is
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little question that it will increase the costs of procurement and transpor-
tation and impose an additional clerical expense as well.
What Has the Law Achieved?
It is not difficult to show that the cargo preference idea has brought
additional cargoes—and revenue—to the American merchant marine and to the
tramp trade in particular. The following statistics demonstrate the point:
During the calendar years 1953-54, the United States exported 66.7 millioi
tons in foreign trade. 79.2 million tons were commercial cargo, and 9.5 million
were foreign aid cargo. U. S.-flag commercial vessels carried 23% of the total
exports and 54% of the aid cargoes. The distribution of carryings was as
follows:55
Of the Total Tonnage,
U. S. Liners carried





Of the Commercial Cargo:
U. S. Liners carried





Of the Foreign Aid Cargo:
U. S. Liners carried





U. S. Tramps carried only 2% of the total export trade, but carried 24%
of the foreign aid cargoes which are subject to 50-50 provisions. It is obvious
that without cargo preference provisions, the U. S. tramp fleet would be greatly
handicapped.
55
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During the 1956 hearings on the Administration of the Cargo Preference
Act before a House Committee, Mr. James B. Stuart, President of the American
Tramp Shipowners Association, made a statement that pretty well sums up the
dependency which 0. S. tramp operators place* in the cargo preference principle:
I can tell you categorically that without the 50-50 provisions of
existing law it would be impossible for the American tramp fleet to
continue in existence at anything like its present size. In the ab-
sence of operating subsidy, our tramp fleet would be driven from the
seas almost immediately should the 50-50 statute be repealed. 56
Conclusions reached by the Department of Commerce seem to collaborate
Mr. Stuart's opinion.
U. S. House of Representatives, Waterbome Cargoes in United States -
flag Vessels . Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,




It is quite apparent that the United States merchant aarine is in need
of assistance if the country is to have a merchant marine capable of meeting
the requirements of the national policy as expressed in the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936, and later Acts. It is especially apparent that the tramp ship oper-
ators require assistance, and that if continued assistance is not forthcoming
the U. S. -flag tramp fleets will disappear from the seas.
Cargo preference so far has been the only factor which has kept the
tramp fleet in business. It can be statistically shown that without preference
cargoes, the U, S. tramp fleet would be measurably worse off than it is at the
present time. Regardless of what stand the opponents to the cargo preference
principle take, it is difficult to deny the fact that such legislation has done
some good. Granted, the 50-50 requirements have tended to increase government
costs in many areas, but when viewed broadly, does it make any difference which
pocket the funds are taken from, when all funds come from the same bank account?
The philosophy behind the 50-50 law appears to be sound. Whether or not
the type of legislation which we now have is the ultimate answer is another
question. There are some serious deficiencies with the present law.
The present laws are difficult and costly to administer. Though they
appear to achieve their purposes, they do so at a very high cost. It would
probably be impossible to compute the overhead costs involved in the execution




or dollars, into the hands of the tramp operators without involving excessive
administrative costs would accomplish as much, or more, at less expense to the
treasury.
Several ideas have been advanced. One school maintains that additional
tax relief would provide an answer. In the case of the operating-differential
subsidy, the tax exemptions now permitted appear to be of as much, or more,
effect as the subsidy itself. Another line of thought is that the tramp ship
operators should be placed under a direct subsidy similar to the operating
subsidy. Great Britain tried that in 1935, with no success. The dividing line
between tramp operations and liner operations is very hazy and ill-defined.
The present operating subsidy is limited to a specified number of voyages over
certain routes. The administration of a tramp subsidy would be extremely dif-
ficult to administer equitably.
Another valid criticism of cargo preference is the fact that it is a
short-range solution to a long-range problem. As previously stated, most of
the tramp cargoes have been foreign aid freight. Foreign aid cargoes have been
steadily declining since 1948, and eventually will decrease to a mere trickle.
It is estimated that by 1960 there will not be enough government-financed car-
goes to keep the present tramp fleet going even if 100% cargo preference is
required. Cargo preference does not appear to be 8 long-range answer.
Sooner or later, the nation must face up to the fact that if the merchant
fleet is to be maintained at an appropriate level, then the taxpayers are going
to be required to foot the bill. The sooner a decision is reached, and the
simpler the solution is, the cheaper that solution will be.
The following steps might lead to a plausible solution:
(1) The size of the Liner and Tramp fleets we need to meet the needs
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of defense, and to stabilize the shipping market oust, within reasonable limits,
be logically determined.
(2) A level of ship utilization should be determined which should be
based on the number of steaming hours, or days, or ton-miles a vessel must
operate in order to earn a fair return for its owners.
(3) A direct cash payment should be made to shipowners on a scaled
percentage of ship utilization.
This solution would at least have the virtue of recognizing that the
merchant marine is important to the commercial well-being and military security
of the nation. It would also offer the following advantages:
(1) The merchant fleet would be able to compete on equal footing in
the world trade. Tramps would be able to compete in the cross trades.
(2) By giving shipowners an opportunity to earn a reasonable return,
there will be greater attraction for private capital in the maritime indus-
tries, and a reduction in construction subsidies might become possible.
(3) It would minimize overhead costs in administration and probably
result in an overall economy.
There is no doubt that such a program of subsidization is strongly
tinged with socialism. Yet it contains the element of free enterprise without
which it would fail. A purely socialized merchant fleet would not be an
answer, and it has already been demonstrated that private enterprise cannot
carry on the job alone, ^omehow, we must reach a balance between government
aid and free enterprise.
No nation has risen to greatness on free enterprise alone, nor on the
strength of arms alone. It is the delicate balance between the democratic
ideals of free enterprise in commerce and the oligarchial principles of military
'
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strength which leads nations on to wealth and prosperity. There is nothing
democratic about a military force, but we need it—there is something social-
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